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We examine the impact of media coverage of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) under the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program on t he equity market valuation of participating bank holding 
companies (CPP banks). We document substantial negative coverage of the CPP and its 
participants over the five quarters following the program’s initiation. We find that the extent of 
negative media coverage about the CPP exerted substantial downward pressure on the stock 
returns of CPP banks, decreasing their valuation relative to bank holding companies not 
participating in the program. We show that our findings cannot be explained by differences in the 
banks’ financial viability at the CPP’s initiation, new information about their performance being 
released to the market after the CPP’s initiation or preceding stock returns causing the negative 
media coverage. Our findings highlight the importance of investor sentiment, as reflected by the 
tone of media coverage, in banks’ valuation during a period of high uncertainty in financial 
markets.   
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The Capital Purchase Program (CPP) was one of the most prominent aspects of the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), established by the U.S. government with the goal of 
stabilizing the financial system.1 Under the CPP, the U.S. Treasury infused capital into 
qualifying financial institutions, while emphasizing that these infusions were not a bailout of 
poorly performing banks. However, the program was the subject of much controversy in the 
business press, as it was not clear whether the program’s participants were actually viable or 
whether the program would support the U.S. economy by increasing the flow of financing to 
businesses and consumers.2 Our objective in this paper is to investigate whether the extent of the 
negative media coverage of the CPP affected the valuation of the bank holding companies (CPP 
banks hereafter) participating in the program. 
Our research question is motivated by the theoretical framework of DeLong et al. (1990) 
and Baker and Wurgler (2006), who show that investor sentiment impacts stock valuation, and 
by the empirical evidence of Tetlock (2007), which indicates that media tone is strongly 
associated with investor sentiment. Media coverage may bring important benefits with respect to 
the dissemination and processing of information about CPP banks, thus reducing investors’ 
information acquisition costs and information asymmetry (e.g., Miller, 2006, Tetlock et al., 2008, 
Fang and Peress, 2009, and Bushee et al., 2010). However, media coverage can also exacerbate 
investor biases (e.g., Vega, 2006, Barber and Odean, 2008, a nd Solomon et al., 2014), thus 
intensifying investor uncertainty about the viability of CPP participants and inducing a transitory 
                                                 
1 The U.S. government provided an extensive rescue package beyond the Capital Purchase Program; this included 
debt guarantees, short-term funding through Federal Reserve Bank facilities, the purchase of impaired assets and 
insurance against potential losses on specified portfolios of assets.   
2 For instance, Stephen Wilson, chairman of LCNB National Bank in Ohio, argued that the “the public perceives 
[participation in the CPP] as weakness” and this is “so discouraging because nothing could be further from the 
truth." (Satow, 2009). Douglas Elliott of the Brookings Institute reasoned that the TARP is "one of the most 
effective large-scale government programs that the public has vehemently decided was a bad idea" (Smith, 2010). 
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shift in investor demand for the CPP banks’ stocks (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 
1998, and Hong and Stein, 1999). Consistently, Tetlock (2007) demonstrates that high media 
pessimism predicts lower stock returns.3 We therefore hypothesize that negative media sentiment 
toward the CPP and its participants exerted downward pressure on the stock returns of CPP 
banks, decreasing their valuation relative to bank holding companies not participating in the 
program (non-CPP banks hereafter). 
The more pronounced effect of investor sentiment on stock prices of firms that are more 
difficult to value (Baker and Wurgler, 2006) further highlights the importance of investor 
sentiment in the equity market valuation of CPP banks. Relative to non-CPP banks, CPP banks 
faced significant valuation uncertainty. First, the acceptance of the capital infusion could have 
signalled to the market larger future losses than what CPP banks had previously disclosed (Hoshi 
and Kashyap, 2010). Second, there was much ambiguity regarding the program’s resolution 
mechanisms and the extent of government’s future involvement in CPP banks’ affairs. The 
participation in the CPP increased investors’ perception of the risk of future government 
interventions (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012). This heightened uncertainty significantly 
increased the difficulty of valuing CPP banks, suggesting that media sentiment played a 
significant role in influencing the valuation of these banks.  
The media can induce, amplify or simply reflect investor sentiment (Tetlock, 2007). We do 
not attempt to distinguish between these different avenues of media influence on stock returns, 
because we are interested in the overall effect of media sentiment on the valuation of CPP 
banks.4 We follow Tetlock (2007) and measure media sentiment by focusing on articles 
                                                 
3 Using the content from a popular Wall Street Journal column “Abreast of the Market,” Tetlock (2007) examines 
the effect of media pessimism on daily returns on the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index and finds that high media 
pessimism predicts downward pressure on market prices. 
4 In addition, it is challenging to convincingly disentangle between different media effects (Tetlock, 2007).  
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published in the Wall Street Journal. In addition to having a strong reputation with investors, the 
Wall Street Journal has the largest circulation of any financial publication in the United States 
(over two million readers) and its electronic distribution reaches over 325,000 finance and 
investment professionals (Tetlock, 2007). Restricting the measurement of media sentiment to the 
Wall Street Journal also allows us to read and analyze each individual article without relying on 
computational linguistic procedures (such as keyword counting, dictionary approaches or Naive 
Bayes algorithms) that are likely to provide less accurate sentiment estimation.5 
Utilizing a number of keywords, “CPP”, “Capital Purchase Program”, “TARP” and 
“Troubled Assets Relief Program,” we extract from the Wall Street Journal 754 articles on the 
CPP and the program’s participants over the October 2008 – December 2009 period. We classify 
an article as having a negative sentiment with respect to the program and its participants when it 
contains negative statements about the CPP, its implications and consequences, and banks 
participating in the program. For example, we view an article as reflecting negative sentiment 
when it expresses criticism about the CPP’s lack of transparency, indicates that weak and 
unviable banks received capital infusions, suggests that the program was not able to stabilize the 
economy and increase lending and blames banks for causing the crisis. We estimate our media 
sentiment measure on a monthly basis by computing the ratio of negative sentiment articles to 
the total number of articles (the Media Sentiment variable). The average of this ratio is 39.6% 
over our sample period, with the program’s most extensive negative coverage occurring during 
the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.  
Controlling for the market beta, bank size and the book-to-market ratio, we relate Media 
Sentiment to the next month stock returns and find that media sentiment substantially decreases 
                                                 
5 We acknowledge that a potential limitation of our analyses is the possibility that the coverage of the CPP and 
participant banks in the Wall Street Journal is not representative of the coverage in other media outlets.  
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the stock returns of both CPP and non-CPP banks. A one standard deviation increase in Media 
Sentiment results in the monthly stock returns of non-CPP banks being lower by 3.33 percentage 
points. This finding suggests that adverse media coverage influences investor sentiment towards 
the entire banking industry, not just program participants, thus adversely affecting the valuation 
of non-CPP banks. We further show that, consistent with our expectations, media pessimism had 
a significantly stronger effect on CPP banks. A one standard deviation increase in Media 
Sentiment results in CPP banks’ monthly stock returns being lower by 1.59 percentage points 
relative to the non-CPP banks’ returns. Thus, the adverse effect of media sentiment on the stock 
performance of CPP banks is 48% stronger than it is on the stock performance of the non-CPP 
banks. These findings suggest that media sentiment exerted downward pressure on the stock 
returns of CPP banks, adversely affecting their valuation relative to non-CPP banks. 
We perform a variety of robustness analyses to support our findings and inferences. We 
start by addressing the concern that our measure of media pessimism does not reflect the media’s 
sentiment towards the CPP program, but rather captures its sentiment towards banks’ 
disappointing condition and performance over the sample period. We incorporate into our 
analyses a b ank-specific monthly media sentiment measure, constructed based on articles 
covering a w ide range of topics related to a bank’s performance, such as its earnings 
announcements, financial position and credit rating changes, as reported by the RavenPack 
database. We find that our findings are robust to this additional control.  
To further mitigate the concern that banks’ financial position and/or performance may 
explain our findings, we conduct a number of additional tests. First, we investigate how the 
central aspects of banks’ financial viability vary between CPP and non-CPP banks. We find that 
at the program initiation (i.e., the end of the third quarter of 2008), relative to non-participating 
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banks, CPP banks had higher profitability and better loan portfolio quality (as measured by the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans). CPP banks also had lower capital adequacy and 
liquidity, but higher proportions of uninsured deposits. We then incorporate these bank 
characteristics in our analyses of banks’ stock performance and find that media sentiment 
continues to have a stronger effect on the stock returns of CPP banks relative to its effect on the 
returns of non-CPP banks. As an additional test that addresses the substantial differences in 
financial viability characteristics between CPP and non-CPP banks, we analyze the sample of 
CPP banks matched with a non-CPP bank sample constructed using a propensity score matching 
methodology and find similar results.  
Second, we assess whether our findings can be explained by media sentiment simply 
reflecting new information about the banks’ performance revealed over the sample period. We 
control for banks’ equity analysts’ coverage and earnings forecast revisions to proxy for the 
transparency of a bank’s information environment and the equity market’s updated expectations 
about banks’ performance. Our findings are unchanged. We also analyse two fundamental 
characteristics of bank performance – profitability and the loan portfolio quality – as reported 
over the sample period. If CPP banks have an inferior performance following the program’s 
initiation relative to non-CPP banks, it may drive media pessimism about the program and its 
participants. However, we find that CPP banks actually outperform non-CPP banks with respect 
to both performance dimensions, in line with their stronger performance at program initiation.  
Next, we address the concern that the effect of the media’s negative sentiment on CPP 
banks’ stock returns could be due to reverse causality, i.e., prior poor stock returns drive the 
more negative media coverage. We perform an event study analysis of stock returns around 
media articles publication dates. We document negative and significant abnormal returns during 
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the event window around the publication of negative sentiment media articles and also find that 
this stock market’s reaction is stronger for CPP than for non-CPP banks. Overall, our robustness 
analyses suggest that the negative media sentiment significantly affected the stock market 
valuation of CPP banks relative to non-CPP banks and that this evidence cannot be explained by 
differences in the banks’ financial viability at program initiation, new information about their 
performance released to the market during the sample period or preceding stock returns causing 
media sentiment.  
In the final set of analyses, we investigate whether the effect of media sentiment on the 
stock market valuation of the CPP banks relative to the non-CPP banks differs with bank size 
and the quality of the bank’s loan portfolio. We find that media sentiment has a significantly 
stronger effect on l arge CPP banks, consistent with their higher visibility making them more 
susceptible to media pessimism with respect to the CPP. However, the effect of media sentiment 
is not significantly different between low and high asset quality CPP banks, suggesting that 
lower asset quality does not exacerbate the effect of media pessimism.  
We contribute to the literature along several dimensions. We extend the literature on the 
role of the media in capital markets. A number of studies show the substantial benefits of media 
coverage, such as enriching the information environment, alleviating informational frictions and 
reducing the cost of information acquisition (e.g., Miller, 2006, Dyck et al., 2008, Bushee et al., 
2010, Fang and Peress, 2009, and Tetlock, 2010). However, prior literature also documents 
negative implications of media coverage, such as generating temporary upward price pressure on 
stocks in the news (Vega, 2006, B arber and Odean, 2008, and Bhattacharya et al., 2009) and 
enhancing investors’ chasing of past returns (Solomon et al., 2014). Our findings emphasize the 
important role of the media in the valuation of financial institutions, by showing that negative 
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media coverage can cause significant undervaluation of banks’ equity. In this respect, our 
findings also add to the literature on the role of investor sentiment in firm valuation more 
generally (e.g., De Long et al., 1990, Baker and Wurgler, 2006, and Tetlock, 2007). We provide 
evidence suggesting that negative investor sentiment exerts significant downward pressure on the 
equity prices of financial institutions during a period of high uncertainty in financial markets. 
We also contribute to the recent literature on government bailouts (e.g., Bernardo and 
Welch, 2004, Taliaferro, 2009, Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010, Veronesi and Zingales, 2010, 
Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012, Duchin and Sosyura, 2012, and Black and Hazelwood, 2012). 
Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) provide evidence on the characteristics of financial 
institutions participating in the CPP, while Mian et al. (2010), Duchin and Sosyura (2012) and 
Tahoun and van Lent (2012) focus on the role of political connections in bank bailouts. Also, 
Taliaferro (2009) and Black and Hazelwood (2012) examine the outcomes of capital infusion 
with respect to banks’ lending activity. We add to these studies by highlighting the potential 
consequences of bank bailouts on investor sentiment with respect to the banking sector. We 
demonstrate that low investor sentiment, stimulated by government intervention, adversely 
affects the equity market valuation of both banks receiving capital infusions and banks not 
subject to the government intervention. These findings are important to policy makers and bank 
regulators that strive to enhance bank stability, in particular in periods of unrest in financial 
markets. To mitigate adverse valuation effects, they may consider designing more effective 
communication strategies to better explain the merit of bank bailouts and how the bailout 
decisions are made. Our study is also relevant to bank managers who have to assess the costs and 
benefits of government interventions. 
The following section presents a brief description of the CPP. Section 3 describes the 
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sample and data. Section 4 discusses our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Background on the Capital Purchase Program  
The Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) was established under the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act, which was approved by the United States Congress on October 3, 
2008. TARP, as originally envisioned in the fall of 2008, w ould have involved the purchase, 
management and sale of up to $700 billion of “toxic” assets, primarily troubled mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities. This framework was quickly abandoned and the program’s scope 
was changed to 12 announced programs that included capital infusions into banks, financing for 
the automotive industry, asset guarantees, the provision of affordable home loans, public-private 
investment programs, etc. The first and most prominent initiative under TARP, the Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP), was announced on October 14, 2008. Initially, the CPP was allocated 
up to $250 billion but, by the program’s close on December 9, 2009, t he Treasury had infused 
only about $205 billion in 742 transactions involving 709 financial institutions.6  
While the CPP aimed to increase the flow of financing to U.S. businesses and consumers 
and to support the U.S. economy, the U.S. government intervention via capital infusions into 
banks was quite controversial. On the one hand, the Treasury emphasized that the CPP was a 
voluntary program through which the government invested in “healthy, viable institutions that 
were recommended by their applicable federal banking regulator” to strengthen the capital base 
of these institutions and improve the stability of the financial system.7,8 Consistent with this 
                                                 
6 The Treasury announced the establishment of another program, the Capital Assistance Program (CAP) in February 
2009; its intent was to ensure that banks had a sufficient capital cushion to withstand larger than expected losses in 
the future. CAP included a stress test to evaluate capital buffers. If capital was needed and could not be raised from 
private markets, the banks would have been forced to accept CAP assistance in return for mandatory convertible 
preferred stock. On Nov. 9, 2009, the Treasury closed this program without making any investments (SIGTARP 
January 2010 Report). 
7  See http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/CPPfactsheet.htm. 
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stated objective, for instance, Valley National Bancorp mentioned in a press release in October 
2009 that it w as “pleased to announce that it has been chosen as one of the nation's stronger 
regional banks to participate in the U.S. Treasury Department's TARP Capital Purchase 
Program.”  
On the other hand, banking regulators and the Treasury did not publicly reveal the criteria 
used to approve the CPP applications, which amplified the uncertainty about the health of the 
financial institutions participating in the program. More importantly, the public and the media 
often characterized the capital infusion under the CPP as a government bailout of relatively 
weaker banks and a waste of taxpayers’ money. For instance, McCall Wilson, president of 
the Bank of Fayette County in Tennessee, said “I knew the community at first would be upset 
because they perceived it [the infusion] as a bailout” (Satow, 2009). Neil Barofsky, the inspector 
general for TARP, after reviewing the bailouts of ten big banks in October 2008, c riticized 
Treasury officials for misleading the public over the health of some of these banks and for 
undermining popular trust in rescue efforts when lending did not increase (SIGTARP October 
2009 Report). Consistent with these statements, we find that during the period when the program 
was initiated, the vast majority of articles in the Wall Street Journal about the CPP or its 
participant banks had a negative (pessimistic) tone.  
Under the CPP, capital was infused into qualifying financial institutions and investments 
were allocated so as to vary from one to five percent of the recipient’s risk-weighted assets.9 The 
investments involved the purchase of non-voting senior preferred shares; the Treasury demanded 
that these shares have a low initial dividend rate of 5% for 5 years and 9% thereafter. The 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Another program under TARP, the Target Investment Program (TIP), set up after the CPP, appeared to be more of 
a bailout of unhealthy banks.   
9 Qualifying financial institutions include bank holding companies, savings associations and certain savings and loan 
holding companies. In this paper, we focus on bank holding companies. 
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purchase of shares also included 10-year warrants that provided the U.S. government with the 
option to purchase common stock for an amount equal to 15% of the preferred equity infusion at 
a specified price in the future. The CPP imposed limits on executive compensation, including 
caps on a nnual compensation, limited tax deductibility of compensation for senior executives, 
restrictions on "golden parachutes" for departing executives and restrictions on bonus payments. 
The program also restricted repurchases of shares not owned by the government and dividend 
payment increases.  
Although the eight largest investments of the program accounted for $134.2 billion, the 
CPP had many more modest investments: 331 of the 709 recipients had received less than $10 
million each by December 2009 (SIGTARP January 2010 R eport). Also, except for nine 
financial institutions that were “forced” to participate in the CPP on October 14, 2008, a ll other 
institutions took part in the CPP voluntarily.10 Selection for the CPP was driven partly by banks’ 
voluntary decision to submit an application but also by the Treasury’s and direct banking 
regulators’ approval to participate in the program. These federal banking regulators, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), evaluated all 
submitted CPP applications based on f actors such as capital adequacy, liquidity, earnings and 
sensitivity to market risks; qualifying applications were sent to the Treasury for final approval.11 
A large number of banks withdrew their applications, but because the Treasury viability criteria 
were not made publicly available, it was not clear how many of them withdrew voluntarily 
despite being qualified or how many withdrew because they were advised by the banking 
regulator that they did not meet the requirements.  
                                                 
10 The capital infusion was initially provided to Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman 
Sachs, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo. However, Merrill Lynch was 
acquired by Bank of America and its capital infusion was provided to Bank of America. 
11 The application period for publicly held financial institutions closed on N ovember 14, 2008; the application 
period for privately held institutions closed on December 8, 2008.   
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The repayment of the capital provided by the Treasury was subject to consultation with the 
appropriate federal banking agency. If the agency confirmed that a bank would have sufficient 
capital after repayment, the bank could pay back the entire CPP investment either in a lump sum 
or over time, as long as each payment was at least 25% of the original total investment (unless 
the last payment was less by default). When returning the CPP investment, banks also had the 
opportunity to repurchase the warrants received by the Treasury at their fair market value. 
3. Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1. Data sources and sample selection  
We obtain bank characteristics from FR Y-C (Call Reports) and stock trading data from 
CRSP. Data on media coverage is retrieved from the Wall Street Journal and RavenPack News 
Analytics, which covers all news disseminated via Dow Jones Newswires. We retrieve data on 
state population from the Census Bureau, data on state gross domestic product from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis and data on state unemployment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
 We use the U.S. Treasury financial stability reports to get information on CPP 
participation; these reports can be found at http://financialstability.gov. By December 31, 2009, 
709 financial institutions had received a capital infusion under the CPP (Table 1, Panel A). We 
restrict our analysis to bank holding companies for two reasons. First, bank holding companies 
were the main recipients of the capital infusions. Second, our research design requires that 
financial institutions have similar characteristics and common financial reporting requirements. 
Because we retrieve financial reporting data from Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank 
Holding Companies – FR Y-C (Call Reports), we limit our sample to bank holding companies 
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(banks hereafter) with total consolidated assets above $500 million.12 In addition, because our 
tests employ equity market data, we analyze publicly traded banks. Our final sample includes 
188 CPP banks (see Table 1, Panel A). Although the CPP banks in our sample represent only 
about 25% of the total number of institutions that received capital infusions, their capital 
infusions make up about 90% of the funds provided to banks under the CPP. For completeness, 
we also present descriptive data with respect to the repayment of capital infusions. Out of 188 
CPP banks, 39 banks repaid the CPP capital by the end of 2009. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the selection process for our control sample. Out of 977 bank 
holding companies with total consolidated assets above $500 million, 346 have publicly traded 
equity. After removing from this sample 188 banks participating in TARP, we are left with 158 
banks that did not announce their participation in the CPP by the end of the first quarter of 2009.  
Table 2 r eports the distribution of the capital infusions over time. We present the 
distribution first by the announcement date (i.e., the date when the bank announced its 
participation in the CPP) and then by the commitment date (i.e., the date when the funds were 
transferred to the bank).13 We supplement this data in the last columns by presenting the 
distribution of repayments and the net outflow-inflow of funds to the Treasury. Banks started 
repaying the CPP funds from March 2009, with the largest repayments in June and December 
2009. For our sample, about 64% of the Treasury’s capital infusion had been repaid by the end of 
2009. Bank executives often referred to the negative media coverage of the program as the 
primary motive for early repayments.  
 
                                                 
12 Bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of less than $500 million file a Call Report called Parent 
Company Only Financial Statements for Small Bank Holding Companies—FR Y-9SP. The FR Y-9SP provides 
more limited data than FR Y-C, which prevents us from incorporating these companies into the analysis.  
13 We collected the announcement dates from Factiva. For banks that did not have a press release about their capital 
infusion approval, we define the announcement date as the day of the relevant TARP transaction report.  
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3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the primary characteristics of bank 
financial performance and viability that we employ in our tests. We estimate these characteristics 
using call reports for the fiscal period ending in September 2008, the quarter prior to the 
program’s initiation. We measure a bank’s profitability by the ratio of year-to-date net income to 
total assets (ROA-ytd) (we provide detailed variable definitions in Appendix A). On average, 
sample banks have a return-on-assets of zero. We estimate a bank’s loan portfolio quality by the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL). The average ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans is 3.4%. The strength of a bank’s capital is measured by the ratio of its total capital to 
risk-weighted assets (Capital Adequacy). The average capital adequacy of the sample banks is 
12.6% (this figure is substantially above the 8% minimum capital requirement). 
We also estimate a b ank’s liquidity, using the ratio of cash to total deposits (Cash To 
Deposits) and find it to be equal, on average, to 5.5%. We measure bank riskiness by the ratio of 
time deposits of $100,000 or  more to total deposits (Uninsured Deposits),14 the ratio of 
available-for-sale securities and trading securities to total assets (Fair Value Exposure) and the 
ratio of the absolute value of net assets that are sensitive to short-term interest movements to 
total assets (Interest Sensitivity). The average values of these measures are 18.4%, 14.8% and 
14.1%, respectively. Bank size is estimated by its total assets and is equal, on a verage, to 
$33.757 billion.    
Based on univariate tests of differences in means across CPP and non-CPP banks, CPP 
banks show a stronger performance in terms of higher profitability and a lower ratio of non-
                                                 
14 We define this measure based on the $100,000 threshold for uninsured deposits, which was the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) threshold on September 30th, 2008. The FDIC increased the deposit threshold up to 
$250,000 in October 2008. Because call reports continue to provide uninsured deposits data based on the $100,000 
threshold, we use this definition in all of our tests.  
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performing loans, but have significantly weaker risk-based capital ratios. In addition, CPP banks 
are substantially bigger than non-CPP banks. There are no significant differences in liquidity or 
in the riskiness characteristics across the two groups of banks. 
Table 3, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for media coverage. To measure media 
sentiment, we retrieve from Factiva Wall Street Journal articles (both in the print and online 
versions) over our sample period using the following keywords: “CPP”, “Capital Purchase 
Program”, “TARP” and “Troubled Assets Relief Program”. After excluding articles unrelated to 
the CPP or banking institutions (e.g., articles on auto or insurance companies), we obtain 754 
articles. Given the subjective nature of the task, two coauthors read and independently classified 
each article into one of three sentiment categories: negative, positive and neutral. In the rare 
instances of disagreement between co-authors, the third co-author’s opinion was used to 
reconcile any differences.  
Negative (positive) sentiment articles are defined as news items that carry negative 
(positive) statements about the program and its implications and/or about participant banks. For 
example, we classify an article as negative when it expresses criticism about the CPP’s lack of 
transparency, suggests that the program was not able to stabilize the economy, mentions 
significant oversights in setting up and managing the program, suggests that the program is 
misusing taxpayers’ money, indicates that weak and unviable banks received capital infusions, 
criticizes the participant banks for not increasing lending or blames banks for causing the crisis 
and misguiding investor and consumers. Examples of positive articles include items that praise 
the CPP for stabilizing the economy, suggest that the CPP supported healthy banks, praise early 
repayments of capital infusions or discuss the good performance of participant banks. The 
remaining articles were classified as neutral. It is important to note that the majority of the 
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articles we identified and classified are primarily devoted to the discussion of the program and its 
implications rather than a discussion of the performance of individual banks participating in it.  
As reported in Panel B, the number of articles ranges from 24 in November 2009 to 84 in 
February 2009, with the most extensive coverage of the program in the first quarter of 2009. The 
proportion of negative sentiment articles over our sample period, measured on a monthly basis 
by the ratio of negative articles to the total number of articles, averages at 39.6%, highlighting 
the media’s pessimism about the program and the participant banks. The program was subject to 
the most extensive negative coverage during the last quarter of 2008 a nd the first quarter of 
2009. The average proportion of negative articles over this period is 55%. There is a significant 
drop in the negative media coverage starting in March 2009. Figure 1 pr ovides a graphical 
illustration of the proportion of negative articles over the sample period. 
 
4. Results  
4.1. The effect of media coverage on bank valuation  
In this section, we focus on the equity market valuation of CPP and non-CPP banks and 
how it was influenced by media coverage. We predict that media pessimism with respect to the 
CPP exerted substantial downward pressure on CPP banks’ stock returns, decreasing their 
valuation relative to non-CPP banks. To examine the effect of media sentiment on the banks’ 
stock market valuation, we estimate multivariate regressions of the banks’ stock returns, 
controlling for the Fama-French (1992) risk factors:  
Stock Returnsi,t = β0 + β1 CPPi + β2 Media Sentimentt-1 + β3 CPPi * Media Sentimentt-1 +         
β4Betai  + β5 Sizei + β6Book  To Marketi +  ε                                                   (1) 
Stock Returnst is computed as the stock return of bank i during month t. The period covered 
is from November 2008 to January 2010. The monthly returns are obtained from the monthly 
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stock file of CRSP. If a bank delists in the interim, we include its delisting return. CPP is an 
indicator variable equal to one starting with the month when a bank announces its participation 
in the CPP, and zero otherwise (this variable takes the value of zero for non-CPP banks during 
the entire sample period). To control for risk, we include Size, Beta, and Book To Market. Beta is 
the market beta obtained from regressing daily stock returns on daily market returns over the six 
months ending on 31 S eptember 2008. Size is the bank’s market capitalization in billions on 
September 31, 2008. Book To Market is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of 
equity on September 31, 2008. Hence, the coefficient on CPP can be interpreted as the difference 
in the risk-adjusted returns between CPP and non-CPP banks.  
Media Sentiment is a m easure of media sentiment, estimated as the ratio of negative 
sentiment articles to the total number of articles in the Wall Street Journal. We measure media 
sentiment on a monthly basis over the month preceding that of the monthly return. As noted in 
Table 3 Panel B, Media Sentiment is measured from October 2008 to December 2009. Because 
media coverage is relatively infrequent, estimating media sentiment over a shorter horizon 
(weekly or daily) will substantially increase the measurement error. The coefficient on Media 
Sentiment reflects the effect of media sentiment on the stock returns of non-CPP banks; we 
predict a negative coefficient on t his variable. While one may argue that media sentiment 
towards the CPP and its participants should not affect the returns of non-participating banks, it is 
likely that negative media coverage influences investor sentiment towards the entire banking 
sector, thus adversely affecting non-CPP banks as well. For example, in numerous articles 
covering the CPP and its participants, banks in general were blamed for causing the crisis, 
mishandling investor trust, exploiting naïve consumers by offering sub-prime mortgages and 
engaging in excessive risk-taking. This negative media coverage could induce, amplify or simply 
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reflect investor sentiment toward all banks, not just CPP participants. Our main variable of 
interest is the interaction term between CPP and Media Sentiment. We predict a negative 
coefficient on this variable, consistent with adverse media coverage negatively affecting the 
valuation of CPP banks relative to that of non-CPP banks. In line with the monthly estimation of 
media sentiment, we perform the analysis using bank-month observations.  
In some of our analyses we also incorporate bank-specific monthly media content measure 
(Overall Bank Sentiment), constructed based on the RavenPack database. We impose two 
restrictions when extracting articles from RavenPack. First, we limit d ata to full-size articles, 
excluding news flashes (news articles composed only of a headline and no body text), news 
articles composed of a headline and mostly tabular data and firm-initiated press releases. Second, 
we restrict data to full-size articles with a relevance score of 75 and above. The relevance score 
is assigned by RavenPack to indicate when the firm is strongly related to the underlying news 
story. The scores range from 0 ( low relevance) to 100 (high relevance). Then, for each article 
that satisfies the above two criteria, we utilize RavenPack’s Composite Sentiment Score (CSS), 
which represents the news sentiment of a given story by combining various sentiment analysis 
techniques.15 CSS scores also range between 0 to 100, with a score above 50 indicating positive 
sentiment; scores equal to 50, ne utral sentiment; and scores below 50, negative sentiment. 
                                                 
15 CSS combines 5 sentiment scores (PEQ, BEE, BMQ, BCA and BAM), while insuring that there is no sentiment 
disagreement amongst these scores. The PEQ score represents the news sentiment of a given news item according to 
the PEQ classifier, which specializes in identifying positive and negative words and phrases in articles about firms 
with publicly traded equity. The BEE score represents the news sentiment of a given story according to the BEE 
classifier, which specializes in news stories about earnings evaluations. The BMQ score represents the news 
sentiment of a given story according to the BMQ classifier, which specializes in short commentary and editorials on 
global equity markets. The BCA score represents the news sentiment of a given news story according to the BCA 
classifier, which specializes in reports on corporate action announcements. The BAM score represents the news 
sentiment of a given story according to the BAM classifier, which specializes in news stories about mergers, 
acquisitions and takeovers. PEQ and BEE classifiers are dictionary-based measures, while BMQ, BCA and BAM 
classifiers are based on the Bayesian learning approach. It is important to clarify that in the above descriptions of the 
sentiment scores “specialize” means that the score was originally developed and tested using different samples of 
media articles. For example, the BEE score was developed based on earnings-related articles and BMQ score was 
developed based on articles about global equity markets. All five sentiment scores are applied to a media article 
when evaluating its CSS score.  
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Overall Bank Sentiment is the average CSS score across all articles about the bank, estimated 
over the month preceding that of the return’s estimation.  
We present the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis in Panel 
A of Table 4. The mean and median Stock Returns are -0.016 and -0.015, respectively. Also, 
Media Sentiment has an average of 39.9 suggesting a large percentage of negative articles. Risk 
variables Size, Beta, and Book To Market have averages of 0.003, 0.991 a nd 1.165.  In Table 4, 
Panel B, we start by estimating model (1) without the interaction term to provide the base results 
with respect to the impact of media sentiment on banks’ valuation (column 1). We find that, 
controlling for market beta, bank size and book-to-market ratios, CPP banks significantly 
outperformed non-CPP banks, as suggested by the positive coefficient on the CPP variable. At 
the same time, media sentiment is negatively associated with the bank stock returns, suggesting 
that the media’s negative perception of the program exerts substantial downward pressure on the 
market prices of banks during our sample period. A one standard deviation increase in Media 
Sentiment translates into amonthly bank return that is 4.23 percentage points lower.  
We present the full specification of model 1 in column 2. We find that the coefficient on 
Media Sentiment, which reflects in this specification the effect of media sentiment on non-CPP 
banks, is negative and significant. A one standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment 
translates into a bank return that is 3.33 percentage points lower. Thus, adverse media coverage 
of the CPP affects the stock returns of non-participating banks, consistent with it in fluencing 
investor sentiment toward all banks, not just program participants. More importantly, we find 
that negative media coverage has a significantly stronger effect on CPP banks relative to non-
CPP banks, as reflected by the significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term 
CPP*Media Sentiment. A one standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment results in the CPP 
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banks’ monthly stock returns being lower by 1.59 percentage points relative to the non-CPP 
banks’ returns. Thus, in terms of economic magnitude, the effect of media sentiment on the stock 
performance of CPP banks is 48% stronger than it is  on the stock performance of non-CPP 
banks. These findings suggest that the media sentiment adversely affects CPP banks’ stock 
returns relative to the returns of non-CPP banks. In column (3) we replicate this analysis after 
eliminating from the CPP group eight banks that were “forced” to participate in the CPP program 
in October 2008.16 This exclusion does not affect our findings: Media Sentiment continues to 
have a substantially stronger effect on the returns of the remaining CPP banks, relative to the 
non-CPP banks.  
In the last column of Table 4, we address the concern that Media Sentiment does not reflect 
media sentiment towards the CPP, but rather captures media sentiment towards banks’ condition 
and performance over the sample period. To mitigate this concern, we augment the model with a 
bank-specific monthly media content measure (Overall Bank Sentiment) and its interaction term 
with CPP. Because RavenPack incorporates all news disseminated via Dow Jones Newswires, 
this sentiment measure relies on a large number of articles covering an extremely wide range of 
topics about a bank, such as its earnings announcements, recent performance, financial position, 
credit rating changes, product market developments and CEO/CFO changes, among many others. 
As a r esult, Overall Bank Sentiment primarily reflects media sentiment about a bank’s 
performance and condition, rather than its sentiment towards the CPP and/or the bank’s 
participation in the program.  
The results presented in column 4 indicate insignificant coefficients on Overall Bank 
Sentiment and its interaction term with CPP. Most importantly, the coefficient on our main 
                                                 
16 While nine banks were “forced” to accept capital infusions, Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America and 
is therefore not included in our stock return analyses.   
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variable of interest, CPP*Media Sentiment, remains robust to these additional controls.  
4.2. Robustness analyses  
In this section, we perform a number of tests to further mitigate the concern that the 
significantly stronger effect of media sentiment on the stock performance of CPP banks relative 
to its effect on stock performance of non-CPP banks can be attributed to the banks’ financial 
position and/or the arrival of new information about their performance over the sample period. 
While the analyses presented in Table 4 s uggest that our primary sentiment measure, Media 
Sentiment, does not reflect media sentiment with respect to banks’ condition and performance, 
we extend our analyses to include additional controls for a bank’s financial viability and the 
release of new information to investors.  
4.2.1. Bank fundamentals associated with CPP participation 
We start by investigating whether the central aspects of bank financial viability differ 
significantly between CPP and non-CPP banks at the time of CPP’s initiation, because the 
differences in these aspects could potentially explain the negative media coverage for CPP 
banks. Specifically, we focus on t he following characteristics of bank financial performance: 
profitability, the quality of the loan portfolio and capital adequacy,. We estimate the following 
logistic regression:  
 CPPi= β0 + β1 ROA Ytdi+ β2 NPLi + β3 Capital Adequacyi + β4 Cash To Depositsi  
+ β5 Uninsured Depositsi + β6 Fair Value Exposurei + β7 Interest Sensitivityi  
+ β8 Assetsi +  β9 Population +  β10 GDP Growth +  β11 Unemployment  
+ β12 Blue State +  ε             (2) 
CPPi is an indicator variable equal to one for bank i which participates in the CPP, zero 
otherwise. In addition to measures of profitability (ROA Ytd), quality of the loan portfolio (NPL) 
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and capital adequacy (Capital Adequacy), we include controls for liquidity (Cash To Deposits), 
riskiness (Uninsured Deposits, Fair Value Exposure and Interest Sensitivity) and size (Assets). 
All bank characteristics are estimated for the quarter ending in September 2008.17  
We also incorporate into the analysis state-level characteristics, as economic and political 
factors within the state might influence a bank’s participation in the CPP (e.g., Li, 2010, a nd 
Duchin and Sosyura, 2012). For the state where the bank is headquartered, we control for its 
population (Population), the percentage change in gross domestic product (GDP Growth) and 
the percentage of unemployment (Unemployment). All state-level variables are estimated in 
2008. Finally, we include an indicator variable that equals one if, in the 2008 presidential 
elections, the Democrats won in the state where the bank is headquartered (Blue State). 
Descriptive statistics on these variables are shown in Table 3, Panel A. 
We present the results of model 2 e stimation in Panel A of Table 5. In column (1), to 
preserve the largest possible sample size, we estimate the model without state controls.18 We find 
a positive and statistically significant coefficient on ROA Ytd, suggesting that more profitable 
banks are more likely to participate in the CPP.19 An increase of one standard deviation in bank 
profitability increases the probability of participation in the program by 13.7 percentage points. 
We also find that banks with a lower quality loan portfolio, as captured by a higher ratio of non-
performing loans (NPL), have a lower likelihood of participating in the CPP. An increase of one 
standard deviation in NPL decreases the probability of participation by 11.5 percentage points. 
The significant difference in non-performance loans across CPP and non-CPP banks is generally 
                                                 
17 In unreported robustness tests, we substitute NPL with a bank’s book-to-market ratio and find similar results. 
18 We do not have data for the state-level characteristics for four banks that are headquartered in Puerto Rico. The 
decrease in the number of observations in column 2 r elative to the 344 ba nks used in column 1 i s due to the 
exclusion of these banks from the analyses.  
19 In unreported tests, we further analyze whether CPP-participating banks engaged in earnings management to 
boost their profitability and improve their perceived healthiness. We look at discretionary loan loss provisions 
recorded by these banks during the period prior to CPP initiation and their change during the CPP participation 
period and find no evidence of earnings management.  
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in line with Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), although it is not directly comparable to their 
findings; we examine capital infusions into bank holding companies, while they examine the 
infusions at the commercial bank level.  Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) show that banks that 
were approved for CPP injections had significantly stronger asset quality than banks that were 
not approved. They interpret these results as suggesting that capital was not provided to banks 
with high levels of troubled assets.  
In addition, we find that banks with higher capital adequacy (Capital Adequacy) are less 
likely to be part of the CPP; an increase of one standard deviation in Capital Adequacy decreases 
the probability of participation by 46.8 percentage points. There is also evidence that a bank’s 
liquidity (Cash To Deposits) decreases the participation probability, while the proportion of 
uninsured deposits (Uninsured Deposits) increases this probability. Finally, we find that larger 
banks are more likely to participate in the CPP.  
In column (2), we augment the model with state controls and find very similar results. In 
column (3), we exclude from the analysis the six banks that were “forced” to participate in the 
program. Note that while capital infusions were provided initially to nine banks, they were 
essentially made to only eight banks, as Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America, which 
then received Merrill Lynch’s share of the capital infusion. Also, Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley did not file call reports for the third quarter of 2008 because they became bank holding 
companies on September 21, 2008. As a r esult, these three banks are excluded from the 
estimation of model 2. Our findings remain largely unchanged, with the exception of the 
significance of the bank size measure in the last specification. 
 In unreported robustness tests, we also examine whether our findings are affected when we 
exclude from the analyses: 1) 90 banks that announced that they were not taking part in the CPP, 
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2) in addition to these 90 banks also 23 banks that withdrew their applications20 and 3) fifteen 
banks that had to comply with stress tests, as defined by the Treasury on February 10, 2009 , 
suggesting that these banks were systemically important and may have been too big to fail.21 We 
continue to find similar results.  
4.2.2 Controlling for banks’ financial viability and new information arrival 
Having established that CPP and non-CPP banks vary significantly across a number of 
important financial performance characteristics at the CPP’s initiation, we augment model (1) 
with these characteristics and their interaction term with CPP. Specifically, we add to the model 
ROA Ytd, NPL, Capital Adequacy, Cash To Deposits, Uninsured Deposits, Size and the 
respective interaction terms to insure that the differences in these characteristics do not drive the 
differential effect of the media on the stock returns of CPP and non-CPP banks. We present the 
results of this estimation in column 1 of Table 5, Panel B. We find that media sentiment with 
respect to the CPP program continues to influence stock returns of both CPP and non-CPP banks, 
with a more significant effect on the latter. Economically, the effect of the media on the stock 
returns of both bank groups is similar to that reported in our primary tests in Table 4. W ith 
respect to bank characteristics, we find that banks with higher capital adequacy experience 
higher stock returns over the sample period, while banks with a higher level of uninsured 
deposits experience lower returns.   
In the second column of Table 5, P anel B to further alleviate endogeneity concerns 
associated with substantial differences in financial viability characteristics between CPP and 
                                                 
20 To identify banks that announced that they are not taking part in the CPP or withdrew their applications, for each 
one of 158 banks in the control sample, we perform a detailed search on Factiva, LexisNexis, Google News and the 
RavenPack database to identify their disclosures with respect to the participation in the program. We select relevant 
disclosures by searching media articles, banks’ press releases and SEC filings using the following keywords: 
“Troubled Asset Relief Program,” “TARP,” “Capital Purchase Program,” “CPP” or “Federal Aid.” 
21 Stress tests under the Capital Assistance Program were imposed on nineteen institutions, but four of them are not 
included in our analysis.  
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non-CPP banks, we employ a propensity score matching methodology. We match treatment 
observations (i.e., CPP banks) with control observations (non-CPP banks) based on bank 
characteristics, which our analyses in Table 5, Panel A suggest are significantly different for CPP 
and non-CPP banks (ROA Ytd, NPL, Capital Adequacy, Cash To Deposits, Uninsured Deposits, 
Size). This approach allows us to retain a sample size adequate for empirical analyses (matching 
on all variables employed in the model 2 r esults in the extreme sample attrition). We use the 
commonly used “nearest neighbor matching” approach with the further restriction that the 
absolute difference in the propensity scores of the matched observations is below a pre-specified 
threshold (i.e., “caliper distance”). More specifically, we match without replacement and, to 
ensure appropriately matched samples, if no untreated observations have propensity scores 
within the specified caliper distance, the treated observation is left unmatched and is excluded 
from the matched sample. In unreported analyses, we also test the matched samples for covariate 
balancing. The differences in variable means between the CPP and non-CPP groups are 
insignificant for all firm characteristics employed in the matching procedure. We find that our 
results are robust despite a s ignificant decline in the sample size: the coefficients on Media 
Sentiment and CPP*Media Sentiment are negative and significant, although there is a decline in 
the significance of the interaction term.  
In the last two columns of Panel B, we investigate whether our results can be explained by 
media sentiment reflecting the arrival of new information about the banks’ performance over the 
sample period. In column 3, we augment the model with the Analyst Coverage variable, which 
reflects whether the bank has equity analyst coverage. Banks with equity analyst coverage 
generally operate in a richer information environment, which may potentially affect the behavior 
of their stock returns. In column 4, we limit the sample to bank with available analysts’ coverage 
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and add a control for the change in the analysts’ consensus mean EPS forecast (Analyst 
Revision). Incorporating Analyst Revision allows us to control for the equity market’s updated 
expectations about the banks’ performance. In both columns 3 and 4, we report statistically and 
economically significant coefficients on Media Sentiment and CPP*Media Sentiment.  
To further address the concern that our findings can be attributed to new information about 
the banks’ performance that becomes available to the market over the sample period, we 
examine two fundamental characteristics of bank performance – profitability and the quality of 
the loan portfolio. While we show that CPP banks have stronger profitability and loan portfolio 
quality at the initiation of the program (Table 5, Panel A), it is possible that their performance is 
inferior following initiation, potentially contributing to the negative media coverage. In Panel C 
of Table 5, we examine how profitability and the quality of the loan portfolio vary over the year 
2009 between CPP and non-CPP banks (we focus on bank performance in 2009 because by the 
beginning of that year the vast majority of sample CPP banks have announced their participation 
in the program).22 We estimate the following model: 
             ROAi,2009 (NPL i,2009) = β0 + β1 CPP i + β2 Capital Adequacy i + β3 Cash To Depositsi  
+ β4 Uninsured Depositsi  +  β5 Fair Value Exposurei +  β6 Interest Sensitivityi  
+ β7 Assetsi + ε               (3) 
All control variables are estimated for the quarter ending in September 2008, with the 
exception of ROA i,2009  and NPL i,2009, which are now measured by the end of 2009. We find that 
CPP banks actually outperformed non-CPP banks over this period. The return-on-assets of CPP 
banks is 0.005 higher than it is for non-CPP banks (column 1). This difference is economically 
                                                 
22 The results are qualitatively similar when we analyze bank performance on a quarterly basis over the 5 quarters of 
our sample period. However, we note that the information on ba nk performance in the last quarter of 2008 i s 
unlikely to affect the differential stock behavior of CPP and non-CPP banks because many CPP banks announced 
their participation close to the quarter’s end.  
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significant as the mean profitability ratio for the sample banks in 2009 is -0.009. Similarly, the 
CPP banks’ ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is lower by 0.018 (column 2). 
Economically, this difference represents 29% of the mean non-performing loan ratio of 0.062 for 
the sample banks in 2009.23   
4.2.3 The reverse causality concern  
The results we have presented so far indicate that the effect of negative media sentiment on 
bank stock returns is unlikely to be attributed to banks’ financial performance revealed over the 
sample period. However, it is  still possible that pessimistic media coverage may be driven by 
banks’ poor equity market performance, raising a concern that causality may go in the opposite 
direction, with stock returns causing negative media sentiment. In unreported robustness tests, 
we add to model (1) a control for momentum in stock returns and find that our results are robust, 
suggesting that the effect of media coverage on stock returns is not subsumed by banks’ previous 
returns. Although this test and the fact that we measure media coverage with a one month lag 
relative to the measurement of stock returns support the causal effect of the media on s tock 
returns, we provide an event study analysis to further examine whether negative media sentiment 
causes downward pressure on CPP banks’ stock returns. 
If media pessimism indeed affects stock returns, we expect a significant market reaction to 
the publication of articles with negative sentiment.24 We identify the publication date of each 
article in our sample and compute the cumulative abnormal stock returns over the two day event 
                                                 
23 In unreported tests, we examine the frequency of bank delistings, given that delistings are typically the result of 
poor economic performance (Shumway, 1997). Consistent with their superior performance, we find that between 
October 2008 and December 2009, CPP banks were much less likely to delist, particularly for negative performance 
reasons, compared to non-CPP banks. Bank delistings in 2009 explain the drop in the number of non-CPP banks in 
Panel C, compared to CPP banks, because we are measuring ROA and NPL as at the end of 2009. Our delisting-
related findings are consistent with Ng and Roychowdhury (2014), who show that banks that participate in the 
capital infusion program are less likely to fail (i.e., to be closed by bank regulators).   
24 In cases where more than one article is published on the same day, we estimate the average sentiment of these 
articles to determine whether we classify the date as having negative or non-negative media sentiment.  
27 
 
window around the article’s publication date (from day 0 to 1). We use size-adjusted returns and 
beta-adjusted returns as our measures of abnormal returns. We compute size-adjusted (beta-
adjusted) returns by measuring the buy-and-hold return over the event window in excess of the 
buy-and-hold return on a value-weighted portfolio of firms having similar market values (beta) 
over the same window. Membership in a market value (beta) portfolio is determined using the 
market value (beta) of equity at the beginning of the calendar year in which the return 
accumulation period begins.  
We present the results in Table 6. First, we compare abnormal returns around the date when 
a negative media article is published across CPP and non-CPP banks and find that the abnormal 
returns for CPP banks are significantly lower.25 The difference in size-adjusted (beta-adjusted) 
returns is -0.393% (-0.424%). Second, within the CPP bank group, we compare the stock return 
reactions on the days when a negative versus a non-negative sentiment article is published. We 
find a significant difference of -0.345% in the size-adjusted returns across the non-negative and 
negative sentiment article publication dates. While the difference in beta-adjusted returns is also 
negative at -0.157%, it i s statistically insignificant. Overall, we view these results as providing 
support for the causal effect of the media on stock returns.  
4.2.4 The effect of media sentiment as a function of bank size and loan portfolio quality  
Having performed a wide variety of robustness tests supporting our proposition that media 
sentiment significantly affects the stock market valuation of the CPP banks relative to the non-
CPP banks, in this section we investigate whether the effect of the media sentiment differs with 
bank size and the quality of its loan portfolio. On the one hand, larger banks have higher 
visibility and therefore may be more susceptible to media pessimism with respect to the CPP 
                                                 
25 A bank is classified as a CPP bank if the announcement of the bank’s participation in the CPP is on or before the 
media article date. 
28 
 
program. On the other hand, larger banks operate in a more transparent information environment 
than smaller banks do, suggesting that investors may place less weight on media sentiment when 
pricing these banks. With respect to the quality of a bank’s assets, the adverse effect of the media 
sentiment may be magnified for banks with a larger proportion of non-performing loans in their 
portfolio. In column 1 of Table 7, we augment model 1 with the indicator variable Large Bank, 
which is equal to one if the bank’s size is above the sample median, as estimated in the third 
quarter of 2008. We also interact this variable with CPP, Media Sentiment and the interaction 
term between these variable to assess the incremental effect of media sentiment on large CPP 
banks. We find a negative and significant coefficient on CPP*Media Sentiment*Large Bank, 
suggesting that, relative to non-CPP banks, media sentiment has a significantly stronger effect on 
large CPP banks. This evidence is consistent with the higher visibility of large banks, which 
increases their sensitivity to media coverage. At the same time, the coefficient on the interaction 
term CPP*Media Sentiment is insignificant, suggesting that the effect of media sentiment on 
smaller CPP banks does not differ significantly from its effect on non-CPP banks. In column 2, 
we augment model 1 with the indicator variable Low Quality, which is equal to one if the bank 
reports above-sample-median levels of non-performing loans in the third quarter of 2008, and 
zero otherwise (we also add all the relevant interaction terms). We do not find that the effect of 
media sentiment differs between the high and low asset quality CPP banks, suggesting that lower 
asset quality does not exacerbate the effect of media pessimism.  
5. Conclusion  
The U.S. government intervention in the economy during the financial credit crisis through 
its Capital Purchase Program (CPP) was unprecedented in terms of its impact and magnitude. 
Although the U.S. government emphasized that its capital infusions into banks were not a bailout 
29 
 
of poorly performing banks, the program received substantial negative media coverage as 
investors and the business community questioned the viability of the program’s participants and 
the program’s ability to support the U.S. economy. Using articles published in the Wall Street 
Journal, the financial publication with the largest circulation in the U.S., to capture the extent of 
negative media coverage about the CPP and its participant banks, we show that over the October 
2008 – December 2009 period, almost 40% of published articles had a negative tone.  
Motivated by the importance of investor sentiment in firm valuation and the strong link 
between investment sentiment and media tone, we investigate whether the extent of the negative 
media coverage of the CPP affected the valuation of the bank holding companies participating in 
the program relative to the valuation of non-participating banks. Understanding media’s impact 
on bank valuation is relevant to policy makers, who may consider enhancing the transparency of 
government bailouts, as well as to bank managers who have to assess the consequences of 
accepting government funds. We document that the negative media sentiment substantially 
decreased the stock returns of both CPP and non-CPP banks, but that it had a substantially 
stronger effect on the valuation of CPP banks. We also show that the effect of media coverage on 
the CPP banks’ returns is significantly stronger for larger banks, but that it does not vary with the 
banks’ asset quality. 
Our findings are robust to a series of tests. We demonstrate that they cannot be explained 
by our measure of media sentiment potentially capturing banks’ performance over the sample 
period or by banks’ fundamental characteristics. Additional event study analyses show that the 
results are also not driven by reverse causality, where a poor prior equity market performance 
causes the negative media sentiment.  
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By providing evidence that the negative media coverage surrounding government 
intervention in the banking sector adversely affected the banks stock market valuation during a 
period of high financial instability, our paper adds to the literature on the role of the media in 
capital markets, the importance of investor sentiment in firm valuation and the causes and 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Analyst Coverage Indicator variable that equals one if at least one analyst is covering the bank during 
the month, and zero otherwise. 
Analyst Revision Change in the monthly analyst consensus mean EPS forecast scaled by the absolute 
value of the mean EPS forecast in the prior month. 
Assets Total assets (in $billions). 
Beta The market beta from regressions of daily stock returns on daily market returns over 
the six months ending on September 31st, 2008. 
Blue State Indicator variable that equals one if the Democrats won in the 2008 presidential 
elections in the state where the bank is headquartered, and zero otherwise. 
Book To Market Ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. 
Cash To Deposits Ratio of cash to total deposits. 
Capital Adequacy Ratio of total capital to risk-weighted assets. 
CPP Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the bank announced its CPP 
participation, and zero otherwise. 
Fair Value Exposure Ratio of available-for-sale securities and trading securities to total assets. 
GDP Growth Percentage change in the gross domestic product of the state where the bank is 
headquartered, measured in 2008. 
Interest Sensitivity Ratio of the absolute value of net assets that are sensitive to short-term interest 
movements to total assets. 
Large Bank Indicator variable equal to one if the bank’s size is above the sample median, as 
estimated in the third quarter of 2008, and zero otherwise.  
Low Quality Indicator variable equal to one if the bank reports above-sample-median levels of 
non-performing loans in the third quarter of 2008, and zero otherwise. 
Media Sentiment 
Ratio of the negative sentiment articles to the total number of articles in the Wall 
Street Journal related to the CPP or the participant banks, estimated on a monthly 
basis.  
NPL Ratio of loans that are past due 30 days, 90 days or non-interest-accruing to total 
loans.  
Overall Bank Sentiment 
Bank-specific monthly media content measure constructed based on the RavenPack 
database. This measure relies on a large number of articles covering an extremely 
wide range of topics about the bank (earnings announcements, financial position, 
credit rating changes, product market developments, CEO/CFO changes, etc.). 
Population Population (in millions) of the state where the bank is headquartered, measured in 
2008. 
ROA Ytd Ratio of year-to-date net income to total assets. 
Size Market capitalization (in trillions). 
Stock Return Buy-and-hold stock returns on a monthly basis using daily returns from October 1, 
2008 to December 31, 2009 (equally weighted).  
Unemployment Percentage of unemployment in 2008 in the state where the bank is headquartered. 





Figure 1:  Negative media coverage of the CPP and participant banks  
 
This figure presents the proportion of the negative articles on the CPP or CPP participant banks in the Wall Street 
Journal from October 2008 to December 2009. The proportion is measured as the ratio of negative articles to the 
total number of articles on a monthly basis. Negative articles are defined as news items that have a negative tone 














Table 1:  Sample selection 
 
This table summarizes the sample selection process. Panel A describes the construction of the sample of 188 banks 
that participated in the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) (i.e., CPP banks). Panel B describes the construction of the 
control sample of 158 banks (i.e., non-CPP banks).  
 
Panel A: CPP banks 
    Capital infusion   Repayments 
    Number 
Amount 
($b)   Number 
Amount 
($b) 






       





       After removing bank holding companies with total 





       After removing bank holding companies that did not have 





              
       Panel B: Non-CPP banks 
 
    
Number of bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of  $500 million or more as of 
September 30, 2008 (including Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) 977 
  After removing bank holding companies that did not have ordinary shares listed on NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ as at September 30, 2008 346 
  After removing 188 bank holding companies that participated in the CPP 158 















Table 2:  The distribution of capital infusions and repayments over time  
 
This table presents the monthly distribution of capital infusions and repayments over the period from October 2008 to December 2009. Columns (1) and (2) 
report the distribution of the capital infusions by announcement date; the announcement date is the date when the bank announced the approval of a capital 
infusion or when the capital infusion is disclosed in the TARP transaction report, whichever is earlier. Columns (3) and (4) report the distribution of the capital 
infusion by commitment date; the commitment date is the date when the capital infusion was transferred to the bank. Columns (5) and (6) report the distribution 
of capital repayments by repayment date; the repayment date is the date when the capital was repaid by the bank. Column (7) reports the net capital outflow from 
the Treasury after taking into account the distribution of the capital infusion (by the commitment date) and the repayment (by the repayment date). For the two 
(one) banks that have received (repaid) capital in installments, the entire capital flow is assumed to have occurred on the date of the first infusion (repayment) 
transaction.  
 
      (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) 
   
Capital infusion 
by the announcement date 
 
Capital infusion 
by the commitment date 
 
Repayment 
by the repayment date 
 
Net outflow  
from Treasury to 
date 
Year Month   
Number   
of banks 
Amount 
($b)   
Number   
of banks 
Amount 
($b)   
Number   
of banks 
Amount 
($b)   Amount ($b) 











































































































































Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics. Panel A presents descriptive statistics on bank characteristics and state-level controls. Panel B presents descriptive 
statistics with respect to the media coverage of the CPP and its participants over the sample period. Variable descriptions are presented in the Appendix. 
Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Bank and state-level variables   
Variable   All banks      
CPP 
banks   
Non-CPP 
banks     
  







Bank-level characteristics (344 banks) 
         ROA Ytd 
 

























Cash To Deposits 
 







 Uninsured Deposits 
 














 Interest Sensitivity 
 
















            State-level characteristics (340 banks) 
         Population 
 







 GDP growth 
 
















 Blue State 
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Panel B: Media articles 
 
Year Month   Articles   Proportion of  
Negative 
Articles       Total Positive Negative   
2008 10 
 






































































61 12 11 
 
0.180 
            
 
      
  





























Table 4: The effect of media sentiment on bank valuation 
 
This table presents the effect of the extent of negative media coverage of the CPP and its participants on bank valuation. 
Panel A presents the means and standard deviations of the variables used in this estimation. Panel B presents the 
regression analyses. The dependent variable is monthly returns from November 2008 to January 2010 for each bank. For 
banks that delist, the delisting returns are included in the month of delisting. CPP is an indicator variable equal to one 
starting with the month when a bank announces its participation in CPP, and zero otherwise. Media Sentiment is the 
ratio of the negative sentiment articles to the total number of articles in the Wall Street Journal related to the CPP or the 
participant banks, estimated on a monthly basis. The sample in column 3 excludes banks that were “forced” to 
participate in the CPP in October 2008. Variable descriptions are presented in the Appendix. Clustered t-statistics at the 
bank level are in parentheses. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (4,937 bank-month observations) 
 
   
Variable    
 
Mean Median Std Dev 
Stock Return -0.016 -0.015 0.226 
CPP 0.541 1.000 0.498 
Media Sentiment 0.399 0.350 0.196 
Beta 0.991 1.067 0.796 
Size 0.003 0.000 0.017 
Book-to-market 1.165 0.915 0.983 
Overall Bank Sentiment 27.017 47.750 24.970 
        
40 
 
Panel B: Regression analyses 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Constant 0.073*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.162 
 
(8.47) (4.73) -4.74 -0.71 
CPP 0.009** 0.041*** 0.041*** -0.207 
 
(2.02) (2.87) -2.84 (-0.87) 
Media Sentiment -0.215*** -0.170*** -0.170*** -0.169*** 
 
(-13.06) (-6.69) (-6.69) (-6.61) 
CPP x Media Sentiment 
 
-0.081** -0.082** -0.082** 
  
(-2.40) (-2.41) (-2.42) 
Beta -0.005* -0.005* -0.007** -0.005 
 
(-1.71) (-1.69) (-2.05) (-1.51) 
Size 0.264*** 0.265*** 1.106** 0.270*** 
 
(3.14) (3.14) -2.38 -3.19 
Book To Market -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(-0.88) (-0.91) (-0.84) (-0.93) 
Overall Bank Sentiment 
   
-0.002 
    
(-0.47) 
CPP x Overall Bank Sentiment 
   
0.005 
    
-1.05 
     N 4,937 4,937 4,817 4,937 





















Table 5: Controlling for banks’ financial position and new information about their 
performance 
 
This table presents the analysis of the effect of media sentiment on bank valuation, controlling for a bank’s 
characteristics and its performance. Panel A presents the analysis of bank fundamentals associated with participation in 
the CPP. The dependent variable is CPP participation. The sample in column (3) excludes the banks that were “forced” 
to participate in the CPP in October 2008. In Panel B, we add additional controls for banks viability and the arrival of 
new information about their performance to our main specification in Table 4, where the dependent variable is Stock 
Return. In column (1) we control for a variety of bank characteristics and interact them with CPP. In column (2), we 
present the results of the propensity score matching estimation. In columns (3) and (4), we add controls for analysts’ 
coverage and analysts’ forecast revisions and their interaction terms with CPP. In Panel C we investigate banks’ 
financial performance at the end of December 2009. In column (1), the dependent variable is ROA, while in column (2) 
the dependent variable is NPL. Variable descriptions are presented in the Appendix. The t-statistics are in parentheses (t-
statistics are clustered at the bank level for Panel B analyses). Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, 
and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Bank fundamentals associated with CPP participation 
      (1) (2) (3) 
        
Constant 4.009*** 4.167*** 4.611*** 
 
(4.25) (2.96) (3.17) 
ROA Ytd 34.378*** 38.626*** 37.303*** 
 
(2.80) (2.98) (2.88) 
NPL -15.352*** -14.643*** -14.647*** 
 
(-3.08) (-2.72) (-2.72) 
Capital Adequacy -34.066*** -34.287*** -35.607*** 
 
(-4.65) (-4.66) (-4.71) 
Cash To Deposits -3.903* -3.895** -6.212* 
 
(-1.95) (-1.99) (-1.69) 
Uninsured Deposits 3.488** 4.020** 3.256* 
 
(2.28) (2.36) (1.84) 
Fair Value Exposure 0.960 1.376 1.541 
 
(0.61) (0.83) (0.92) 
Interest Sensitivity 0.873 1.204 1.042 
 
(0.80) (1.07) (0.92) 
Assets 0.005* 0.005* 0.004 
 





















    N 344 340 334 
N (CPP) 186 184 178 
N (non-CPP) 158 156 156 




Panel B:  Incorporating financial viability and new information arrival measures 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Constant 0.182 0.343 0.185 0.462 
 
(0.77) (1.14) (0.78) (0.84) 
CPP -0.296 -0.428 -0.309 -0.703 
 
(-1.20) (-1.39) (-1.25) (-1.26) 
Media Sentiment -0.166*** -0.168*** -0.166*** -0.166*** 
 
(-6.42) (-5.60) (-6.42) (-3.99) 
CPP x Media Sentiment -0.089*** -0.079* -0.089*** -0.112** 
 
(-2.62) (-1.89) (-2.62) (-2.04) 
Beta -0.007** -0.008* -0.007** -0.002 
 
(-2.19) (-1.87) (-2.15) (-0.31) 
Size 0.419** -0.063 0.446*** -2.582 
 
(2.40) (-0.10) (2.62) (-1.06) 
Book To Market 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.003 
 
(0.24) (0.59) (0.19) (0.25) 
Overall Bank Sentiment -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.009 
 
(-0.51) (-1.03) (-0.51) (-0.87) 
ROA Ytd -0.065 -0.393 -0.042 0.351 
 
(-0.42) (-0.52) (-0.27) (0.38) 
NPL -0.318* -0.547 -0.309* -0.357 
 
(-1.75) (-1.51) (-1.71) (-1.41) 
Capital Adequacy 0.177** 0.294** 0.175** 0.343** 
 
(2.09) (2.06) (2.05) (2.18) 
Cash To Deposits -0.033 0.044 -0.034 0.623** 
 
(-1.50) (1.01) (-1.55) (2.01) 
Uninsured Deposits -0.146*** -0.114 -0.144** -0.112 
 
(-2.60) (-1.64) (-2.52) (-1.14) 
Assets 0.000** -0.000 0.000** 0.002** 
 
















CPP x Overall Bank Sentiment 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.014 
 
(1.16) (1.46) (1.16) (1.31) 
CPP x ROA Ytd 0.289 0.300 0.201 0.404 
 
(0.63) (0.38) (0.43) (0.35) 
CPP x NPL 0.326 0.446 0.308 0.584 
 
(1.19) (1.06) (1.14) (0.98) 
CPP x Capital Adequacy 0.277 0.086 0.332 0.263 
 
(1.28) (0.34) (1.49) (0.57) 
CPP x Cash To Deposits 0.063** -0.043 0.060** -0.601* 
 
(2.18) (-0.74) (2.01) (-1.90) 
CPP x Uninsured Deposits 0.106 0.079 0.103 0.122 
 
(1.60) (1.01) (1.54) (1.10) 
     
     
43 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CPP x Assets -0.000** 0.000 -0.000** -0.001* 
 
(-2.44) (0.90) (-2.37) (-1.90) 

















  N 4,907 3,338 4,907 2,090 














































Panel C:  Banks’ financial performance following CPP initiation 
 
  (1) (2) 
      
Constant -0.032*** 0.085*** 
 
(-4.85) (6.17) 
CPP 0.005* -0.018*** 
 
(1.87) (-3.43) 
Capital Adequacy 0.152*** -0.161* 
 
(3.56) (-1.82) 
Cash To Deposits -0.003 0.023 
 
(-0.31) (1.01) 
Uninsured Deposits -0.045*** 0.125*** 
 
(-3.03) (4.01) 
Fair Value Exposure 0.062*** -0.113*** 
 
(4.18) (-3.70) 
Interest Sensitivity 0.005 -0.003 
 
(0.41) (-0.15) 
Assets 0.000 0.032** 
 
(0.02) (2.42) 
   N 321 321 
N (CPP) 184 184 
N (non-CPP) 137 137 


























Table 6: Event study analysis of negative media coverage 
 
This table provides additional robustness tests to investigate whether negative media sentiment has a causal effect on CPP banks’ stock returns. We identify the 
publication date of each article in our sample and compute cumulative abnormal stock returns over the two days event window on and after the article’s 
publication date. We proxy for abnormal stock returns using size-adjusted returns and beta-adjusted returns. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 




CPP banks Non-CPP banks Difference 
 
CPP banks Non-CPP banks Difference 
-0.521*** -0.128* -0.393** 
 
-0.678*** -0.254* -0.424** 
       




Negative media days Non-negative media days Difference 
 
Negative media days 
Non-negative media 
days Difference 
-0.521*** -0.176** -0.345** 
 
-0.678*** -0.521*** -0.157 










Table 7: Cross-sectional variation with size and loan portfolio quality 
 
This table investigates whether the effect of media sentiment differs with bank size (column 1) and the quality of its loan 
portfolio (column 2). The dependent variable is Stock Return. Variable descriptions are presented in the Appendix. 
Clustered t-statistics at the bank level are in parentheses. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * 
denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
    
Constant 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 
(3.52) (6.82) 
CPP -0.008 0.033*** 
 
(-0.40) (2.90) 
Media Sentiment -0.177*** -0.147*** 
 
(-5.15) (-8.46) 
CPP x Media Sentiment 0.051 -0.080*** 
 
(1.11) (-2.95) 
Beta -0.013** -0.005 
 
(-2.31) (-1.64) 
Size 0.288*** 0.299*** 
 
(3.42) (3.66) 
Book To Market -0.003 0.001 
 
(-0.80) (0.16) 
Large Bank 0.015  
 
(0.63)  
CPP x Large Bank 0.081***  
 
(2.95)  
Media Sentiment x Large Bank 0.017  
 
(0.34)  
CPP x Media Sentiment x Large Bank -0.227***  
 
(-3.49)  
Low Quality  -0.014 
  (-0.57) 
CPP x Low Quality  0.019 
  (0.66) 
Media Sentiment x Low Quality  -0.046 
  (-0.88) 
CPP x Media Sentiment x Low Quality  -0.002 
  (-0.03) 
N 4,937 4,937 
R-squared 0.043 0.041 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
